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Over the last decade, recession has plagued the economy of Puerto Rico—a
Commonwealth territory of the United States—and the island has increased
its public debt by an unmanageable amount in order to balance budgets and
provide necessary services.
A lack of economic opportunity, which compelled many
of the territory’s citizens to move to the U.S. mainland
or to leave the labor force altogether, worsened the dire
fiscal state of the island, which receives federal revenues
but does not collect federal income taxes from its residents (see Figures 1 and 2).
As of April 2016, Puerto Rico has amassed roughly
$72-73 billion in debt and is unable to meet its payment obligations, to say nothing of its $44 billion in
unfunded pension liabilities. The Commonwealth has a
debt-to-income ratio in excess of 100 percent.1 Puerto
Rico’s municipalities, including its public utility companies, owe much of this debt to creditors comprising,
in large part, U.S.-based mutual funds and hedge funds.
A significant portion of Puerto Rico’s debt, however, is
attributable to the territory itself in the form of general
obligation (GO) bonds (see Figure 3).
Not even the island’s largest creditors know exactly
which parts of the Commonwealth are responsible for
which debts, and Puerto Rico has complicated matters
further by using funds appropriated to various government agencies to pay its guaranteed GO debt. Necessarily, this has involved further cuts to government

SUMMARY
• This Issue Brief summarizes events surrounding the current
debt crisis in Puerto Rico and presents a two-step plan for
restructuring Puerto Rico’s debt and encouraging more effective governance. This plan draws extensively on the previous
experiences of debt crises in municipalities on the U.S. mainland.
• Step one entails the creation of a financial control board (FCB)
for Puerto Rico, monitored by the U.S. federal government but
involving significant Puerto Rican representation, which would
terminate its active role in Puerto Rico’s affairs once fiscal
benchmarks are established and satisfied. This FCB needs to
have more authority than envisioned in the proposal by Senate
Democrats, but less than that recommended in draft legislation
from House Republicans.
• Step two would be for Congress either to craft a restructuring
framework applicable to all of America’s territories, or to extend
the existing bankruptcy laws in Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
Code (with modifications) to Puerto Rico and its municipalities.
• Together, these two steps would remove the risk that Puerto
Rico will pick and choose which obligations to pay and ensure
that creditors’ priorities will be honored—all the while avoiding
a true taxpayer-funded bailout. But Congress must act quickly.
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services, exacerbating the population
exodus. Unlike municipalities (e.g.,
Detroit) that are hampered by severe
debt and economic stagnation and
reside within the U.S. states, Puerto
Rican municipalities cannot declare

and which prohibit debt restructuring
outside of bankruptcy. Lacking obvious means for sufficient fiscal reform,
the island has taken matters into its
own hands.
In this Issue Brief, I will sum-
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FIGURE 1: PUERTO RICO’S GNP, DEBT, AND POPULATION
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Chapter 9 bankruptcy to restructure
their debt obligations because Puerto
Rico’s municipalities (along with
Washington, D.C.) were excluded
from Chapter 9 by a 1984 amendment
to the Bankruptcy Code. Yet a federal
appellate court held that the Commonwealth must abide by Chapter 9
restrictions that apply to all U.S. states

marize the recent events surrounding the debt crisis in Puerto Rico. I
will then present a two-step plan for
restructuring Puerto Rico’s debt and
encouraging more effective governance in a manner that, on the one
hand, promotes the island’s democratically elected authority and, on the
other hand, addresses concerns that

any federal intervention constitutes a
“bailout.” 2

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE
TERRITORY
In January 2016, Puerto Rico missed
a second consecutive debt payment,
as it was unable to meet all of its
interest rate obligations. Despite the
territory’s heralded inability to satisfy
future interest payments on its debt,
including $422 million in payments
due in May and $2 billion in July,
Congress has been slow to take action.
Draft legislation from Republicans
in the House Committee on Natural
Resources, which has jurisdiction over
all U.S. territories, has stoked sharp
criticism from the Commonwealth.
An earlier Senate bill proposed by
Democratic Senator Bob Menendez
(D-NJ) received a more favorable
reception from Puerto Rico, but was
strongly criticized by Congressional
Republicans.
Sensing a threat to its democratically elected authority, and uncertain
whether Congress will act, the Commonwealth demonstrated its independence by passing legislation permitting Puerto Rico’s governor to impose
a moratorium on any debt payments
through the beginning of 2017 while

NOTES
For comparison, this is well above the maximum 60 percent
level that the EU requires of its members.
2 The recommendations in this Issue Brief come from Clayton
P. Gillette and David A. Skeel, Jr., “A Two-Step Plan for Puerto Rico”, Institute for Law and Economics, U. Penn. 16-3
(2016). Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2728466.
3 For more information on this proposal, see Reuters, http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-puertorico-debt-idUSKCN0X81MY.
4 See Franklin California Tax-Free Trust vs. Puerto Rico, 805
1

F.3d 322 (1st Circuit 2015) for the case that struck down
the Recovery Act.
5 For discussion of the various forms and roles of financial
control boards, see Clayton P. Gillette, “Dictatorships for
Democracy: Takeovers of Financially Failed Cities”, 114
Columbia Law Review, 1373 (2014).
6 Some of the entities that have issued debt in Puerto Rico,
and there are at least 18 of them, might not qualify as
“municipalities” and some might not meet Chapter 9’s insolvency requirement. These include the Government Develop-

2

ment Bank, which serves as the Commonwealth’s fiscal
agent, Prepa, the public electricity company, and COFINA, a
conduit for the issuance of bonds secured by sales taxes.
7 Clayton P. Gillette and David A. Skeel, Jr., “Governance
Reform and the Judicial Role in Municipal Bankruptcy”, Yale
Law Journal (2016).
8 Professors Mitu Gulati and Robert Rasmussen have argued
that Puerto Rico’s creditors are subject to an implied duty of
good faith that could be used to catalyze a voluntary restructuring. Mitu Gulati & Robert Rasmussen, “Puerto Rico—
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simultaneously extending a relief
proposal of its own to creditors.
Specifically, Puerto Rico would like to
cut down the debt that is directly or
indirectly owed by the territory, about
$49-50 billion, through new public
debt offerings, in a direct appeal to
creditors who fear that the alternatives
(i.e., Congressional legislation or lawsuits filed by the creditors themselves
against the territory for breaching
debt contracts) could lead to worse
repayment outcomes.3 The problem
here is that, even if most bondholders
favor this non-bankruptcy restructuring, any restructuring arrangement
without a majority voting provision is
not binding on bondholders who do
not consent—and there could be a lot
of them.
As for the remainder of the debt,
most of which belongs to public
utility companies, the Commonwealth attempted to establish grounds
for restructuring that portion via
bankruptcy-like proceedings when
it passed a 2014 law known as the
Recovery Act. The legality of the legislation was challenged and, initially,
opposing creditors won rulings in federal trial and appellate courts to halt
the law’s implementation.4 However,
the Supreme Court surprised both the
Commonwealth and its creditors by

deciding to take the case. The Court
heard oral arguments in late March,
signaling that the future of the Recovery Act, and what its restructuring
capabilities could mean for the rest
of Puerto Rico’s public debt, is far
from certain.
Although Puerto Rico’s creditors
would welcome a financial control
board (FCB), they have lobbied
aggressively against proposals to
create a bankruptcy or other federal
restructuring option for Puerto Rico,
especially proposals that would extend
both to Puerto Rico’s municipalities
and to the territory itself. Creditors
that are willing to at least consider a
restructuring option insist that it rely
entirely on majority voting by each
class of creditors, and that a restructuring not be “crammed down” on any
class of creditors that votes against it.
Congressional relief for the territory has proponents and critics in
both political parties and for different reasons. What is clear is that any
rescue measure—extending Chapter 9,
developing a territory-specific solution, or otherwise—must address the
full burden of Puerto Rico’s debt. At
best, it also would assist in correcting
the larger problem of dysfunctional
governance on the island. While
Puerto Rico may not want limits on

NOTES
Debtor, Heal Thyself,” FT Alphaville, Jan. 14, 2016, available
at http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2016/01/14/2148906/guestpost-puerto-rico-debtor-heal-thyself.
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its democratically elected authority,
as called for in the bills proposed by
the Senate and the House Committee
on Natural Resources, the Commonwealth remains unable to grow its way
out of debt, and thus far, it has given
no indication that it can navigate its
current economic challenges or avoid
similar ones in the future. Some financial controls are warranted, but the
details matter a lot.

STEP ONE: AN EFFECTIVE
FINANCIAL CONTROL BOARD
Financial control boards serve the
purpose of restructuring democratic
processes that have failed to provide
services that are desired (or needed)
by constituents at a tax price that
induces residents and firms to remain.
A properly designed FCB that has
authority over Puerto Rico’s budgets
and related issues can play a critical role in the rehabilitation of the
territory’s distressed government. An
FCB can provide expertise to officials,
assurances to capital markets, and a
way to overcome political obstacles to
financial reform that elected officials
might find unattractive. In constraining the authority of elected officials,
the FCB further addresses the moral
hazard of local overspending that can
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precede requests for financial relief
from the federal government.
For an FCB in Puerto Rico to
be effective, it must have significant
Puerto Rican representation, but
Congress must establish it and set
its parameters. This approach has
worked to overcome severe financial
distress in major municipalities on the
U.S. mainland, especially in the cases
of New York City in the 1970s and
Washington, DC in the 1990s.5 An
FCB augments, rather than replaces,
elected officials. If designed appropriately, it only minimally will disrupt
democratic processes and it will withdraw as soon as the controlled entity
(i.e., Puerto Rico) satisfies objective
benchmarks consistent with financial
stability. Here is a summary of what it
should look like:
APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS

President Obama, after consultation
with the Chair of the House Committee on Natural Resources, currently
Rep. Rob Bishop (R-UT), and the
Resident Commissioner for Puerto
Rico in the House of Representatives, Pedro Pierluisi, would make the
following appointments to a sevenmember board.
• Two ex-officio members: Governor
Garcia Padilla of Puerto Rico and
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, Jack
Lew
• Three of five voting members from
Puerto Rico, giving Puerto Rico
majority representation on the board
• Two of five voting members from
the private sector, providing substantial experience in budgeting,
public debt, and capital markets

The inclusion of the Puerto Rican
Governor provides legitimacy to the
FCB, and it also allows him to benefit
from the expertise of the other members of the board. The presence of the
U.S. Treasury Secretary or his designate ensures representation of federal
interests in the fiscal health of the U.S.
territory. All seven appointments find
precedence in state FCBs.

five-year plans, the latter of which
it would commission. Such plans
increase transparency by providing
benchmarks against which actual
spending can be measured. After the
FCB withdraws, benchmarks will
be necessary for observing deviations in expenditures. However, the
FCB would not be permitted to
determine spending priorities within
a balanced budget, as that would

FIGURE 2: LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE
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POWERS OF THE BOARD

1.The FCB should have the authority to negotiate with creditors and
enter into binding debt adjustment
agreements, once the board is able
independently to determine and
provide transparent and credible
portrayals of Puerto Rico’s current
financial situation.
2.The control board should be given
both authority and funding to commission and review audits of Puerto
Rico or any of its municipalities and
affiliated entities.
3.The FCB should be able to approve
or disapprove annual budgets and
4

undermine the authority of democratically elected officials.
4.Board approval should be required
for all substantial contracts, including collective bargaining agreements
with public service unions.
5.The FCB should have authority to
approve or disapprove any new debt
issuances.
6.While the FCB should not replace
elected officials, as was done in
Detroit, the FCB could ensure fiscal
prudence by receiving and disbursing all revenues that would flow
to the Commonwealth. This finds
precedence in New York City and
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Washington, DC control boards.
The capturing of revenues may be
politically infeasible, but disbursement capability during a control
period is beneficial even by itself.
7.The board should impose “best practices” for budgeting and account-

to alleviate Puerto Rico’s financial
distress. A second step is required.
Congress either should give Puerto
Rico and its municipalities access to
the existing municipal bankruptcy
laws in Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy
Code, or it should craft an alterna-

FIGURE 3: BREAKDOWN OF PUERTO RICAN DEBT
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ing, as well as sanctions, including
removal, against officials who violate
its orders or policies.
TERMINATION AND REINSTATEMENT
OF BOARD

The FCB would terminate its active
management role in the Commonwealth once fiscal benchmarks are
established and satisfied. It would,
however, reassert an active role if
deficits or other specified signs of
crisis returned.

STEP TWO: A
RESTRUCTURING LAW FOR
U.S. TERRITORIES—NOT
JUST PUERTO RICO
The discipline provided by an FCB,
though critical, will not be enough

tive restructuring framework for all
of America’s territories. A sufficient
rescue package could utilize either
approach, but the latter option is
preferable because it naturally takes
into account the idiosyncrasies of territories and it maintains key distinctions between them and the states.
Congress’s authority to enact a new
restructuring law would come from the
Territories Clause in Article IV of the
U.S. Constitution and the Bankruptcy
Clause in Article I.
Regardless of approach, both
the territories themselves and their
municipalities should be eligible for
relief, meaning Chapter 9 would
need to be amended to include both
the territory and its municipalities if
Congress selects that option. Only
allowing municipalities to restructure
5

their debts, as the case of Puerto Rico
shows, ignores large portions of government debt owed directly or indirectly by the territory itself (roughly
$50 billion with Puerto Rico), which
could prevent a territory from returning to fiscal health.6 Such an approach
is not available to U.S. states, as only
their municipalities have recourse to
bankruptcy and not the state itself.
Crafting a solution applicable exclusively to territories in order to address
the crisis in Puerto Rico, therefore,
would signal to states that they should
not expect similar treatment, and it
would assuage any concerns that the
law is not “uniform,” as required by
the Bankruptcy Clause.
The Puerto Rican Governor
and the FCB each should be given
independent authority to invoke the
new law. If the territory itself files to
initiate restructuring and meets the
law’s entrance requirements, any of
its municipalities or affiliated entities
should be permitted to file as well,
and the latter group should not be
subject to the insolvency requirement
(see Footnote 6). Per the Bankruptcy
Code, all of these entities need to be
treated separately, but the option to
develop a single reorganization plan
should remain on the table.
KEY PROVISIONS OF TRADITIONAL
BANKRUPTCY TO INCORPORATE
INTO A NEW RESTRUCTURING LAW

1.Impose an automatic stay on litigation to prevent creditors from “racing to the courthouse.” Puerto Rico
already faces a growing number of
costly lawsuits due to its missed
debt payments.
2.Ensure that a majority vote binds
each class of creditors.
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3.Provide the right to assume desirable contracts and terminate undesirable contracts, with some special
restrictions regarding collective
bargaining agreements.
4.Allow financing to be provided
by public or private entities. There
need not be a designated source
of public funding akin to what the
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 mandates
for systemically important financial
institutions.
5.Creditors must be protected by
definitions of “unfair discrimination”
and “best interests” in order to avoid
another Detroit scenario. The rule
of law took a beating in the Detroit
bankruptcy. Creditors who held that
city’s GO bonds, which had the
same priority as pensions, received
only about 41 percent of what they
were owed, and several classes of
creditors that voted against the plan
received far less. Pensioners, meanwhile, received 60-70 percent. To
protect the future investment potential of Puerto Rico, Congress should
explicitly require that recovery rates
for creditors with the same priority
cannot deviate more than a specified
amount, such as 15 or 20 percent.
This would be a way to “discriminate fairly.” Additionally, Congress
should define “best interests” to
mean that a restructuring plan
guarantees as much recovery for
creditors as is reasonably possible, as
opposed to the “something’s better
than nothing” ruling handed down
in Detroit.
6.The “feasibility” requirement should
include governance reform. Bankruptcy courts should decline to
approve a restructuring plan as
feasible if it does not address obvi-

ous governance dysfunction that is
frequently a primary cause of fiscal
distress.7 Puerto Rico exemplifies
this dysfunction, as about 120 government agencies provide services
on the island with insufficient
centralization to avoid overlap and
to coordinate responsibilities. A plan
that fails to eliminate or consolidate
government agencies should be
rejected as not “feasible.”

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS
AND ALTERNATIVE
OUTCOMES
The two steps of this plan are closely
connected. Of particular importance
is the authority given to the FCB
to initiate the restructuring process.
However, as comprehensive as this
plan may be, Puerto Rico still needs
a larger plan for future economic
growth. The Commonwealth clearly
would benefit from federal correction to some harmful economic
constraints, like the artificial restriction on Medicaid reimbursements for
territories. Another often-mentioned
source of relief would be a relaxation
of the federal minimum wage requirement, which is relatively high for the
Puerto Rican economy. This idea has
found favor among some economists
in both political parties.
MORATORIUM AND VOLUNTARY
RESTRUCTURING

Absent Congressional action, Puerto
Rico could use its moratorium authority to halt payment on some or all of
its future debt payments through early
2017 to give itself breathing room
while coordinating debt restructuring
with creditors outside of bankruptcy
6

via new debt issues. Some creditors
have offered their own proposals
already. For this to be successful, an
overwhelming number of creditors
would need to support the strategy
and withhold lawsuits. Averse to
the presence of a control board, the
Commonwealth is attempting to
orchestrate this scenario presently.
Some commentators have argued that
Puerto Rico could draw on existing
law to force its creditors to negotiate in good faith.8 But it is not clear
whether or not this ad hoc restructuring strategy is a viable course.
RECOVERY ACT RESURRECTION
The Supreme Court could rule in
favor of the Commonwealth and
reassert the validity of the Recovery
Act, which would allow Puerto Rico
to restructure the debt belonging to
its public utility companies ($22-23
billion). Such a ruling certainly would
be appealed, likely for violating the
Contracts Clause of both the Puerto
Rican and U.S. Constitutions, and it
could take many years for the island to
implement the Act in any way.
A TAXPAYER-FUNDED BAILOUT
A true bailout might be demanded
from U.S. taxpayers if Congress does
nothing and Puerto Rico is unable to
work out new arrangements with its
creditors to write down some of its
current debt. Since it is now clear that
the territory is insolvent (and facing
costly lawsuits from some creditors),
the debt crisis could evolve into a
humanitarian crisis if the island is
forced to default outright (i.e., runs
out of cash entirely). The Government
Development Bank already has been
reduced to a “bridge bank” simply for
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financing essential public services, and
it is rapidly exhausting its capital.

CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy or a territorial restructuring law can mitigate Puerto Rico’s
debt problems, so long as terms like
“unfair discrimination,” “best interests,” and “feasibility” are properly
defined in response to recent rulings on municipal bankruptcies. The
financial control board and restructuring law for territories proposed in

this Issue Brief draw extensively on
the experience of other debt crises in
U.S. municipalities, such as those in
New York City and Detroit. These two
steps remove the risk that Puerto Rico
will pick and choose which obligations to pay, and they ensure that
creditors’ priorities will be honored.
An FCB would augment elected leadership and correct broken democratic
processes, while bankruptcy law would
avoid the need for a true taxpayerfunded bailout.
This plan will only work if Puerto
Rico addresses its dysfunctional

7

governmental structures and receives
federal policy support for overcoming
its long-lasting recession and population flight. Relative to the proposal
from Senate Democrats, this plan calls
for an FCB with greater oversight
and decision-making authority. And
compared to the Republican draft
legislation from the House, which in
its initial form gave too much power
to the FCB, this plan provides a
more balanced approach. There is a
path forward for Puerto Rico, but it
requires Congress to act this year.
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